War

L The Terrain of Palestta. U. The Jkthod of War. UL The Conduct of War. iv. Treaties. V. Tile Outiook of the Prophet on W»r. vi. Allusious to War in the NT. i. The Terrain of Palestine.— The first re- quisite for understanding the wars of the Bible is a knowledge of the geography of Palestine.

We need to know something about the routes wliich so unwieldy a traveller as an army can use, the physical and artificial obstacles which hinder it in its march, the [)laces which allow it room for fight- ing or for encamping, and other similar geographical details. (In reading this article the reader snould have open before him the large map of Palestine prefixed to vol. i. of this Dictionary). The great strategic routes are three in number.

There is the important road which, coming from the north and skirting the coast of the Mediter- ranean, passes Tpe, Mount Carmel, and Gaza, and finally reaches the border of Egypt. Then there is the scarcely less important route, now followed by the railway from Damascus to Haifa, which takes a S.W. direction to the Jordan, and then crosses the whole length of the fertile plain of Esdraelon in a N.W. direction to the neighbourhood of Mount Carmel.

The meeting of this road with the first- mentioned in the plain of Esdraelon confers great strategic importance on the plain. There armies could meet, victual themselves, and find room to manoeuvre both with footmen and with chariots. There, too, in ancient times stood four of the chief fortresses of Palestine, put there to hinder the free use of the great plain by an enemy (cf. G. A. Smith, HGHL^ ch. xix. pp. 387-390).

The third great strategic route lies east of the Jordan and runs from Damascus through Sela (Petra) to the port of Elath at the head of the Gulf of Akabah. Besides these three great routes, none of which touched the heart of the land of Israel, some others must be mentioned which gave access to the central range. Two of these are mentioned below as giving strategic importance to GUgal. A third, starting from the modern Jenin, crosses several small plains and easy passes (cf. HGHL^ ch. xvi. p.

327), and gives access from the north to the city of Samaria. It is a route which must often have been followed by Syrian invaders. On the west, the hUl-countrj' ot Judoea was pierced by several rugged and wind- ing passes, the best knowTj being that which is marked by the Upper and Lower Beth-horon. These passes were the scene of much of the irregular fighting which went on between the Philistines and Israel.

Before leaving this subject one possible strategic line, lying for the most part outside Palestine, must be mentioned, i.e. the sea route from the Egyptian Delta to the coast of Palestine. The possession of this line gave the king of Egypt an advantage ovel the rival power (Assyrian or Babylonian) in the Euphrates Valley, in that it enabled him to threaten his enemy's line of communications by landing troops in his rear.

It has been suggested that Pharaoh-neco reached Megiddo partly by the ses route in the reijjn of Josiah (but cf. HGlIL'p. 405, note 2), and it is possible that there is an allusion in Dt 2S'** to the possession of such a route by Egypt (but cf. Driver, in loco). Ol localities of strategic importance the plain of Esdraelon has already been noticed. A second spot of similar interest is the plain of Gilgal, the S.W. part of the Arabah or ' plains of Jericho.'

Here Israel encamped after crossing the Jordan (Jos 4" lu" ; cf. Jg 2'), and here the headquarters remained, until a more central place, either Shiloh (Jos 18' 22" 24> [LXX]), or Shechem (Jos 24' [MT]), was secured to Israel. From Gil^al a pass leads west- wards over the great central ridge by Bethel and the two Ueth-horons down to the maritime plain. Some distance north of Gilgal another pass leads uji the Wady Farah {FArCah), sometimes identified with the Brook Clierith, in a N.W.

direction to Shechem. The first of these routes was probably followed by Joshua in his marches on Ai (Jos 8*1 and on Gibeon (Jos 10»- ') ; the second is probablj WAR WAR 893 f; referred to in Jg 1-'", where the conquest of Bethel hy the house of Joseph is recorded. In this enumeration of routes and localities no reference has been made to Jerusalem. In- deed its strategic importance was not great. Neither Alexander of Macedon {pace Jos. Ant. XI. viii. ; cf. Piepenbring, Histoire, pp.

590-592), nor Napoleon Bonaparte when on the march to Egypt, deigned to turn aside to Jerusalem. To an Assyrian king engaged in a similar expedition, Lachish and Libnah (2 K 19*), both on the edge of the ShephC-lah (see Map), were each of more im- portance than the comparatively remote Jewish capital. It wa.s the political influence of IJezeViah over the Philistine malcontents which caused Sennacherib to detach a strong force (2 K 18") against Jerusalem.

Isaiah was right in holding that it was possible for Judah to maintain a policy of isolation in the face of the clash of the great powers of western Asia. These powers seldom desired to encumber themselves with such ' a burdensome stone' (Zee 12 ) as Jenisalem. Shi- shak, king of Egypt, did indeed capture the city in the reign of Itehoboam, but only because Solomon had made it a city worth plundering (1 K H-^- =*). Ilazael, king of Syria, ' set liis face to 'oupagain.

st Jerusalem,' but commuted his hostility :or a payment in money (2 K 12"- '"). Similarly was Sennaclierib bought ofl' once at least (2 K IS"-'"). Pharaoh-neco, kin" of Egyjit, slew Josiah at Megiddo and deposed Jehoahaz at Kiblah ' in the land of Haniath,' but does not seem to have turned aside to Jerusalem (2 K 23^'^). Nebuchad- rezzar was at least equally contemptuous.

Jelioi- alfim was in a state of rebellion against Babylon for eight years, but the great king contented him- self with sending marauding bands against his vassal. Jerusalem was outside the sphere within which great captains contended with great armies. Samaria, on t!ie otiier hand, was comparatively of gieat strategic importance. It stands on a c<mi'manding hill (well shown in Sir R. Temple's Palestine JllitJitrated, p.

180) where the important road from Jenin meets at right angles the broad, 'fat valley' (Is 28') which slopes westward towards the plain of Sharon and tlie .Mediterranean. East- ward, passes of no great ditlienlty lead to the fords of the Jordan. Tims Samaria was strategically as well as politically ' the head of Ephraim ' (Is "'■'). We have now liad occasion to mention represen- tatives of three classes of fortresses in Palestine.

On the south-west, Libnah, Lacliish, Gezer, and Beth-lioron guarded Judah against Kgypt, the Philistines, and tlie inhabitants of the Sinaitic Peninsula. On the edge of tlie jilain of Esdraelon stood Megiddo, Jezreel, and other fortresses closing the dillerent approaches. On tlie central ridge, Jerusalem and Samaria were strongly fortitied. Two classes of fortresses remain to be mentioned.

On the border between the northern and southern kingdom (Jeba and Mizpah and other cities were built to stop the passage of possible fugitives and de.serlers and to watch the frimtier (1 K 15'°""'^). Lastly, the great fortresses ea.st of Jordan, of whi(-h perhaps IJamoth-gilead was the most im- portant (1 K 22', 2 K 8=" 9'), must be mentioned ; Dor must the watch-towers, built to protect the uads and watch over tlie pa-stures, bo forgotten (see TovVKR).

The geographical conditions of Palestine were such that the kind of warfare best known to the Hebii;ws must have been the foray. The south of Judah lav oi)en to the Amalekites and other pre- datory tribes (1 S 30). On the east were the Midi.inite freebooters (Jg 6'- ■•).

Against these the Jordan was an aTiibiguous defence, for, if the in- vaders could seize one of the fords by surprise, they could held it with a rearguard against pursuers while the booty was being safely carried ott' into the desert. The Philistines (I S 13"), the Moabites (2 K 13-"), and the Hebrews themselves (David, 1 S 27'*; Joab, 2 S 3"-; and Gad, Gn 49") were much given to making raids (' roads,' AV). ii. The Method of War. — (a) The Prelimxn- ari€s.

— Wars were regularly begun in the spring, in order that if possible operations might be con- cluded before the beginning of winter (cf. 2S 11'). Yet winter did not always bring relief from the pressure of war (Jer 8™), and sieges were sometimes prolonged over twelve months, e.g. that of Samaria (three years, 2 K 17°) and Jerusalem (eighteen months, 2 K 25>-»}. Something approaching to a declaration of tear was sometimes given, e.g.

by Amaziah of Judah to Jehoash of Israel (2 K 14"), and negotiation was sometimes tried, e.g. by Jephtliah with the king of Amnion (Jg 11'^), in order to avert war; but such instances are not common. Before beginning a war, eflbrts were generally made to gain religious sanction for the step. Inquiry of God was made before the ark (Jg 20-''- ^ [Heb. and LXX] and 1 S 14'8 [Heb. only]), or before a priest wearing the ephod with Urim and Thummim (1 S 14'8 [LXX only], 1 S 2S» [Heb.

and LXX], and 1 S 30' [Heb. and LX.X]), or through a prophet (Micaiah, 1 K 22"), or by means of dreams (Gideon, Jg 7"), or even through a familiar spirit (the witch of Endor, 1 S 2S'). Hence the phrase ' to consecrate ' a war or warriors ; Jl S'-, Mic 3\ Jer B" ; Is 13», Jer 22' 51'-', ». Moreover, the ark was sometimes carried by Israel into the field (1 S 4"-", 2S 11"), and, on the other hand, the Philistines took 'their images' with them (2 S 5-').

When there was no ark to go forth, individual Israelites were fovind who carried into battle ' consecrated tokens of the idols of Jamnia' concealed under their garments (2 Mac 12'").

The people in general were warned of the approach of an enemy or summoned to war (1) by the blowing of trumpets (1 S 13», Ezk 33i-«, Am S") ; (2) by putting up ensigns on bare heights to mark rallying places (Is 13-), or by kindling fires on suitable lull summits (Jer 6' [AV]) ; (3) by sending messengers throughout the land (Jg 7-'', 1 S 11').

It was sometimes necessary to rouse a warlike feeling by unwonteil appeals to indigna- tion or to fear ; in Jg 19-'' the Levite sends the pieces of his divided concubine into every part of Israel, and in 1 S 1 1' Saul sends the hewn pieces of a yoke of oxen throughout Israel with the threat of so destroying tlie cattle of any who should be slack to obey his call. In advancing to attack, a leader gave his troops a watchword ('for Jehovah and for Gideon,' Jg 7" ; cf.

2 Mac 8-' Sous avvdriixa 8(ou fiorjOdas, also 13'° BeoS vkTjv) ; and sometimes a ' pamn' was sung (2 Ch 20", 2 Mac 12" Korapfo^eoos T-iji' /xcfl' C^^uv Kpavyriv). (b) Strategy as illustrated by campaigns con- dtictid in Palestine. — Strategy is the art of choos- ing the right route by which to attack or await the enemy. For an instance of consummate strategy we may take the Philistines' conduct of the campaign of Gilboa (IS 28-31).

Instead of attacking Israel by the direct route tlirough the defensible valleys of the south-wost, where chariots could hardly ]iass, much less mamcuvre, the army of Achish, with its chariots and horsemen, struck northward, aiming at the fertile plain of Esdraelon, and drawing Saul away from his Benjamite strong- liolds. The Israelites failed to close the pa.

sses over the eastern end of Mount Cariiul, and the Philistines poured into the plain, where they could victual their large army and use their chariots with effect. Saul's hillmen could not nie<'t the enemy in such a place with huk'Ii hope of success. Their king was oiitinaiclied and ontmanoeu\Ted. No wonder that liis stout heart trembled when he saw the Philistines in force on this vantage- ground (1 S 28*- '). The battle of Gilboa was from the first only a forlorn hope for Israel.

On the other hand, when the Philistines ' came up to seek David' (2 S 5"'-'), their strategy was faulty. Despising the enemy, tliey twice came up the Judu-an (or possibly the Benjamite) valleys into the small plain of Rephaim (between Jerusalem and Bethlehem). Twice did David await his oppor- tunity in the hold (v.") hard by, and twice dui he inflict a severe defeat upon tlie Philistines.

They failed because through over-con lidence they chose a route more favourable to the enemy tlian to themselves. (c) I'aciics. — The tactics of the Israelites in the earliest days were very simple, but often very effective. First a surprise gained by stratagem, and then a sudden rush of men in which personal prowess had its full opportunity. For sucli warfare the strong individuality of the Hebrew race htted them in a very high degree.

The stratagems de- scribed in the historical books belong to all periods and are of various kinds. (1) Nifjht marches and night attacks were fre- quent. Joshua marched all night to the relief of Gibeon, and, it seems, surprised the Amorites at dawn (Jos 10"). Mesha (Moabite Stone, line 15) captured Nebo from Israel by similar tactics. Gideon assailed the Midianite camp ' at the begin- ning of the middle watch ' (Jg 7'"), i.e. about mid- night. Saul attacked the Ammonites in the morning watch, i.

e. shortly before dawn (1 S 11"). Joraiu, king of Judah, when surrounded by the Edomites, cut his way through them vrith his chariots by night — a great feat, needing a clear night and able leading (2 K 8-'). (2) An ambush w;is a favourite stratagem. By this Ai was cap- tured (Jos S'o-^*), and Gibeah (Jg 20""-"). The Syrians tried it against Israel without success (2 K 6"- "). With the ambush a pretended (light of the main body was often combined.

(3) Similar to the ambush was the device of giving a deserted appearance to a camp, in the hope of taking tlie enemy at a disadvantage when he came to spoil it (2 K 3-', cf. 7'-}. (4) A well-organized force amid be ilicided just before an engagement, and the enemy put at a disadvantage by attack from more than one dii'cction (Gn 14", 2 S 18-, cf. v.*).

The usual defensive tactics of the Hebrews con- sisted of standing in close order, shield touching shield, with spears carried at the charge, and of awaiting the attack of the enemj'on higher ground and with the front protected by a wfuly or other obstacle. Such probably was tlie array ('^?^;^.? maarakhah) with which they fronted the Philis- tines in the valley of Elah (1 S 17^')- In such a position they were unassailable, and things might well remain at a standstill for forty days (v."

[not in LXX B]). Unless the position could be turned by a flank movement, the only resource left to an assailant was to seek to shake the steadiness of the array by enticing the prominent warriors to leave their posts to engage in single combats. This resource the Philistines in the valley of Elah tried in vain. ' The men of Israel [when they saw Goliath] fled from him [back to their places in the array]' (v.^-").

Israel s simple tactics were really adapted only to broken country, such as the liill, country of Judah, with its caves and deep rugged wfidis. The enemy when defeated said, not without truth (IK 20-^), 'Their god is a god of the hills; therefore they were stronger than we.' For more scientific tactics we have to look to Israel's foes. We see such in use at the battle of Gilboa.

Saul, like Harold at Hastings, bad formed his army probably in close order on a hillside up which the enemy must advance to attack. But the Philis- tines, like the Normans towards the close of tha battle of Hastings, prepared the way for the decisive attack by flights of arrows. Saul fell like H.arold, pierced through by the archers (1 S 31").

Then, and not till then, the Philistines could trust their chariots and horsemen to make a successful charge up the slope (2 S 1'), and a de- cisive victory was won. Another j_'ood though unsuccessful piece of tactical skill was shown by the Syrians at the battle of Ramoth-gilead. The Syrian king massed his chariots (1 K 22^'), and endeavoured to obtain a decisive effect by emploving them at a decisive point, viz. the person of Aliab.

Ahab escaped this danger through his disguise, and was thus able to encourage his army by his presence ' until the going down of the sun.' Thus Israel was repulsed but not routed at Ramoth-gilead. (d) Fortresses played an important part in the wars of Palestine. In the days of the Judges Israel had no fortresses, but had to take refuge from Midianite (Jg 6-) and Philistine oppression (1 S IS"*) in cave districts and among the mountains.

But the land is studded with heights suitable for fortified posts, and under the kings these were crowned with walled cities. Fortresses (cities ' ha\'ing gates and bars,' 1 S 23') were surrounded by walls of stone or of sun-dried bricks, built often close to the precipitous sides of a hill or mound.* If there were no precipice near to defend the wall, then a trench (Vri hel) was added.

Samaria had such a trench (1 K 21^ [' wall ' AV, ' rampart ' RV]) ; and Jerusalem, though none was needed on the E., where ran the deep valley of Jehoshaphat, probably had one elsewhere (La 2^). The walls of Jerusalem were strengthened with towers and furnished with battlements (Jer 5'° 'thy branches' [RV, prob. a poetical term for 'battlements' AV], cf. Zeph 1" and 2 Ch 26'»). On the walls were placed engines for throwing arrows and great stones (2 Ch 26'^).

Of the attack of strong places by the Israelites we have many notic^es. Jericho was captured by coup de main with an ease in which Israel rightly saw the hand of God ; the falling of the walls seems to be a metaphor describing the failing of the hearts of the defenders (Jos 6-°, cf. 2"). Similarly, Judas Maccahajus is said to have cap- tured a strong city by ' rushing wildly against the wall' (ifiaeiaav flij/iiuSuJs ry relxd, 2 Mac 12").

Sometimes fire was applied to burn the gates or to set lire to a wooden defence (Jg y"-'>-) ; this device is also pictured on the As.syriaii reliefs. As early as the time of Da\'id the ' mount' or ' bank' (i^^d solcldh, see below) was employed (2 S 20"). If these means of attack failed, the besiegers were obliged to maintain a wearisome blockade, until surrender was brought about by famine or treachery. The fall of Ralibah was perhaps hastened by threatened water-famine (2 S 12-').

The S\'rians (Arama!ans) probably used engines (1 K 20'- [RVm]) ; and the Assyrians, as masters of the art of war, practised regular siege operations. Great shields or screens were raised against the wall (Is 37**), behind which archers were set to keep under the ' fire ' of the defenders. Under cover of this bombardment a causeway was built (perhaps by captives) from the Assyrian camp to the city to be attacked. Rising gradually in height, it waspushe<l nearer and nearer the city.

Such a mound, when it touched the wall, might oe used to facilitate an escalade or to bring the battering-ram on a level with the upper part of the wall. Another instrument of attack used • Compare Flinders I'ctrie (.Tell el-Ueey, 1891) and F. J. BUM {A Mound 0/ many Cituji, 1891). WAR WAR 693 bv the Assyrians was a movable tower occupied by archers iF^Lese archers succeeded in c eannj: the TJ\ oi its defenders, the to'jver could then be p\r.hed up to the wall and the place taken by stor'..

(cf. 1 Mac 13«-«). The steps in a siege are 'TrPaltenAf^f^or. on service wa3 appar- ently mXehieflv in the form of booty There are, however some allusions to pay of an ordinary kind. A^^'i'ahTs said to have hired If f^, /7™ ^"Tt^^i^^^K;:5^ro^is treasury api Kave his forces pay (.iV'W'o, t'- i^o P T(l' 9^) for a year (1 Mae 3-). Bu booty meint more to a warrior than pay, as the dis- appoint ent of the Israelite mercenaries shows ??'a ".«'»■ i», cf. Jg 5'»).

Booty was to be divided 'nenu^l shares bftween tho- -ho went inU^the battle and tliose who guarded the ^a . P IJ- -W ^ A chosen part was sometimes deiUcated to tne Lord (sUve'r and gold, 2 S S'- ; sh.cp and oxen, 1 S 15-M, or re vrved for a leader (1 b du ). iii THE Conduct of W ab. -The treatment o conquered enemies was often veiy severe.

DaMd removed the Ammonites from Kabbali and t e other cities of Amnion which he captured, and put them to the hardest task-work '" ^l-e oim of hewinc stone and making brick (2 b 1- ). me auTedlrmies of Israel, Judah, and Edom deliber- fe m™e a desert of Moab lilline the good U^d tLft Vorid'-i^ l^L (1 K U'»). Tlfe still more horrible cruelty of massacring women with ^.

Ud 'rmore often ascribed to tl- enemy than to Israel itself (tlie Syrians in 2 K 8'-, Menabem ol Israel in 2 K 15'°, Amnion in Am l"). ^Tore reasonable severity was_ sl>o«^ by ex oatriating the llower of an enemy's army (the hrst &tan captivity. 2 K ?-'".);i';r^-f.l-^d°^") of the waU of an enemy s city (2 K 14 ana M ), '^"^^l::^^i:rlnil^.^are worthy of note. ^!

;^l;'t^JS^fi^^n^ui^k|,;^/ir^v on Elfshas advic'e, fed and dismissed in safety a detachment of Syrians ^vl,oln the prophet had taken by stratagem (2 K 6 ) There m some uncerUinty aa to the »'<'»•"''•"'»''■';'* S^'TSTe ,tr.?y ..rael at the con,u^t „'„'„-»-; ''i^'ar^rRaifai? w^ nJ, ni D no IcM than U' b a later docuniont than Jt , (2) it 's Bul(l) u no '™ V'"" ^„, f„ 91110.14 conUins the earher law Ur from improbable that Dt 20' «>""'";, j n.^i the (.pplicab> even to war w.th the Canaamtes).

ana i by inlenuarriage. iv Trvativs. -Treaties of peace were granted to a' beaten foe, the most common condition beini, Uie ™vment of an indemnity (Sennacherib to y ezel^iH\rrn 2 K 18'). A modern-sounding treaty is that made by Ahab with Bon-hadad (IK 20«) : cities ca^)ture<r from Israel were to be restored and the ri.'ht to trade in I )au.a.scus was to be conceded An [nltance of a barbarian's treaty is tha ollered by Nahash of Amnion to Jabesh-gilead (1 b 11 ) oi^he condition that the P^^^\ .

^y^",^ ^^7^^^ defender (? or of every inliabitant) of Jabe^i- Kilead should be put out. Savage as the oiler is, it was probably seriously meant. v ThV UutIook of the Pkophets on Wak.- The earliest prophets show no horror of war as i'ar ^ut leai or encourage their own people to rp^i^t the enemy. Deborah the prophetess rouses her countrymen^ against Sisera (Jg 4-) and gives the signal for the%attle (^^»).

Samuel is at the head of the rising against the Philistines (1 S t' , perhaps a late passage, but of importance in this L'nSon). In unnamed P-pJet enco^.rages Ahab against Ben-hadad (1 K 20'^- ). ^''='l»^ « prophetic activity is the turning, point in the Sai^^^ against^Ioab (2 K 3"-^») ; and the same pro;";:^?. on his deathbed !>eartens Joash o^ Israel in the contest with SjTia (2 K 13 ). An inte?

es i^ng touch of mercy or of good policy appears n EHs la's treatment o/ the Syrian pr-soners m |>"k gi'-^. In the writing prophets, however, from Amos onwards we have a wider outlook upon war. War is no longer a mere event; it has become a X-nibol. The'coming Day of the LORD is associ- ated with terrible wars (Am o- /, Is 13 , J» fuV-") On the other hand, the Latter Days are to be marked by universal peace, between nation and nation ancdven between man and beast (Is "'-•' 9, ' t'-^ 11°''.

Mic 4', ' ; cf. Zee 14" ■' ). ^^ vr. ALLUS?0NS TO WAR IN THE ^T -In the Gospels three references to war, all in l>uke, can for notice. In 3» .rrpar.i-iAce.o. (' soldiers on se vice ■ RVm) ask for and receive counse from John ihe Baptist. In 14^' our Lord takes a leson from the action of a king in calling a council of ^var.andin 19-Heprophes^s that l^e enemy will cast up a bank (xapcKu) against Jeru saleni On these passages cf. Plummer s ,!m!. Uil.e. n the Epltles, St.

Paul shows in a dozen refer^ ernes to a soldier's career that he looked at t tvith interest and even with sympathy. He caUs the Christian life 'the good warfare (1 li l ). efers to the soldier's -S.-^^^-^d.Co 9 ), ho ds up tl e soldier's ideal of service for mutation 2 1 ', ■ praises the Colossiansas an inspecting o hcei mig it praise a legion (Col 2=), and compans tlie recoveiy of the erring for Christ to the takm- of captives a ive in battle (2 Ti 2=«).

The apostTe, moreover, Scsciibes himself in words of Btarthng sternness n^j waghig a warfare » .ari -^-^P- aS'"-!:.P"t The disShedience in his converts 2 Co lO ). In t e Apocalypse there are several references to the teat struggle between the saints and he powers S evil, fhevc is ' war in heaven,' which results n ?he drac'on and his angels being cast down to ear i ( Rev P'^-'^). The Beast (ri tf^io.) makes war with the saints by commission from the Dra-'on (1.J-, omitted by AC. etc..

has the support of tTie Syr.ac text-Philoxenan?-published by Gwynn, IbDO- The k n 'S of the while world (rr,5 oUov^i^r,, S.yn^) arefeVither^d together to liar-magedon for the war of the great day of God the Almighty (16'' ). TheWord (6A47oOof God. who • in njiLteousness doth judge and make war.'

leads the arimes which are in heaven to final victory over the Beast '^The'general teaching of the NT on war can hardly be better given than m the following words: 'We have seen then so far that war is sanctioned by the law of nature-the constitution o' man and 'the constitution of .^o^J^'y ;, '^".'' V?

the teaching and practice of Christ and immediate disciples, f^"'-" bnuiutions f Hi» Certain limitations are un 696 WARD WASP posed, on the ground of expediency, by society ; And, in the ideal brotlierhood of men to which the Christian gospel teaches all men to asjiire, war would be impossible. But, with a view to the necessary process of the attainment of this ideal, war in the abstract is not condemned.

Here as always the Christianity of Christ looks to the motive' (liethune-Baker, Influence of Christianity on War, 18S8, p. 18). LlTKRATURR. — Benzinper (1894), Heb. Archdotorju, p. 360ff.; Nowack (1804), Ueb. ArchdoloQie, i. pp. 367-375 (very full); G. A. Siiiiih, HGUL ipastim), See also -Armour, Ca3ip, E.noixe, Kencku Cities. W. EmeRY BaRNES.